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Abstract. In this paper we present a comprehensive comparison be-
tween pairing-friendly elliptic curves, considering different curve forms
and twists where possible. We define an additional measure of the effi-
ciency of a parametrized pairing-friendly family that takes into account
the number field sieve (NFS) attacks (unlike the ρ-value). This measure
includes an approximation of the security of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in F∗pk , computed via the method of Barbulescu and Duquesne [4].
We compute the security of the families presented by Fotiadis and Kon-
stantinou in [14], compute some new families, and compare the efficiency
of both of these with the (adjusted) BLS, KSS, and BN families, and with
the new families of [20]. Finally, we recommend pairing-friendly elliptic
curves for security levels 128 and 192.
Keywords: Optimal ate pairing, twists of elliptic curves, jacobian co-
ordinates, TNFS-secure, SexTNFS.
1 Introduction
Pairings first appeared in 1940 when Andre´ Weil showed that there is a way to
map points of order r on a supersingular elliptic curve to an element of order
r in a finite field; his map became known as the Weil pairing. In 1986, Victor
Miller [25] gave an algorithm that computes the Weil pairing efficiently, and in
1993, Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [24] applied Miller’s method to the ellip-
tic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for supersingular elliptic curves.
They reduced ECDLP for supersingular elliptic curves to the discrete logarithm
problem in a finite field (DLP), giving a subexponential attack now known as the
MOV-attack. This attack was followed by the more general FR-reduction [16],
which can be applied to ordinary elliptic curves (and higher-dimensional abelian
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varieties) when using a variant of the Weil pairing called the Tate pairing. In
the early 2000s, several authors presented efficient pairing-based protocols (see
e.g. [8,9,21]) which are now the backbone of privacy-related cryptosystems, the
security of which relies on the aforementioned cryptanalysis. More recently, pair-
ings have started being deployed in the marketplace, for example in the Elliptic
Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation (ECDAA) protocol that is embedded in
the current version of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), namely TPM2.0 [19].
1.1 Pairings on elliptic curves
For the introductory material on pairings and attacks in this section, Section 1.2,
and Section 2.1, we follow [15, Section 1.1], [15, Section 1.2], and [15, Section
2.1] respectively.
Let G1,G2 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order r and assume that the
DLP is intractable in all three groups. An abstract pairing is a bilinear, non-
degenerate, efficiently computable map of the form:
ê : G1 ×G2 → GT . (1)
When G1 6= G2 the pairing is called asymmetric.
Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over a prime field Fp and let r
be largest prime such that r|#E(Fp). We define the embedding degree k of E to
be the minimal integer k for which all the r-th roots of unity are contained in
Fpk . For all pairings on elliptic curves that are currently used in cryptography,
the groups G1 and G2 are r-order subgroups of E(Fpk) and the group GT is the
subgroup µr ⊆ F∗pk of rth roots of unity. That is, a pairing of elliptic curves is a
map:
ê : E(Fpk)[r]× E(Fpk)[r]→ µr ⊂ F∗pk .
The most widely used pairings on ordinary elliptic curves can be efficiently com-
puted using variations of Miller’s algorithm [25].
1.2 Attacks on pairings
For the curves that we consider, the best attack on ECDLP in an r-order sub-
group of E(Fpk) is Pollard’s rho algorithm, which has complexity O(
√
r). The
complexity of DLP in the multiplicative group F∗pk depends both on the con-
struction of k and of p. In the case of most pairing-friendly curves, the primes
p and r are large (at least 256 bits) and are derived from the evaluation of
polynomials; we say that such primes are of special form.
When the embedding degree k is prime, the asymptotic complexity of DLP in
F∗pk is Lpk [1/3, 1.923], due to the number field sieve (NFS) method. For compos-
ite embedding degrees, Kim and Barbulescu’s [23] improvements on the tower
number field sieve (TNFS) method have reduced the complexity of DLP in F∗pk
from Lpk [1/3, 1.923] to Lpk [1/3, 1.526] (in the most extreme cases). The concrete
complexity of the NFS method for a given example can be computed using Bar-
bulescu and Duquesne’s method [4]. These new improvements have immediate
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consequences on the selection of the extension fields Fpk . A summary of (new)
recommendations of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, for many different embed-
ding degrees, that are resistant against the new TNFS attacks is presented in [14].
The security of these recommendations was approximated via asymptotics.
1.3 Our contributions
We present new candidates for pairing-friendly families for both security levels
128 and 192. We also introduce a new measure, the τn-value, for the efficiency
of a pairing-friendly family that takes into account the latest attacks (unlike the
ρ-value). We compare the candidate families and recommend two families for
security level 128 together with a choice of elliptic curve in that family, which
should perform about 12% faster than the fastest pairing-friendly elliptic curve
that was previously available the literature. Finally, we recommend two efficient
pairing-friendly elliptic curves for security level 192.
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2 Preliminaries
We use the method of Brezing and Weng [10] for generating pairing-friendly
families of elliptic curves, and in order to make concrete recommendations we
use the method of Barbulescu and Duquesne [4] to compute the security of the
target group. We briefly summarize these here for the convenience of the reader.
2.1 Pairing-Friendly Curves
For the construction of pairing-friendly elliptic curves we use complete polynomial
families, introduced by Brezing and Weng in [10]. For a given embedding degree
k > 0 the elliptic curve parameters p, t and r are described as polynomials
p(x), t(x), r(x) ∈ Q[x] respectively such that
4p(x)− t(x)2 = Dy(x)2,
where D > 0 is the CM discriminant and y(x) ∈ Q[x]. These polynomials must
also satisfy the relation
Φk(t(x)− 1) ≡ 0 mod r(x),
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where Φ(x) is the kth cyclotomic polynomial. Additionally, these polynomials
satisfy p(x) + 1− t(x) ≡ 0 mod r(x), which ensures that the order of the elliptic
curve has a polynomial representation as #E(Fp(x)) = h(x)r(x).
We can generate elliptic curve parameters by evaluating the polynomial fam-
ily at some integer u such that r = r(u) and p = p(u) are both prime and
t = t(u) ≤ 2√p (cf. Hasse bound). The polynomials p(x), t(x), r(x) from our
constructions are integer-valued, which we define to mean that there exist in-
finitely many u ∈ Z for which these polynomials produce integer values.
2.2 Efficient Pairings
To our knowledge, the most efficient asymmetric pairing in the literature is the
optimal ate pairing, which was introduced by Vercauteren in [26]. In this case
we set:
G1 = E(Fp)[r] ∩ ker(pip − [1]) and G2 = E(Fp)[r] ∩ ker(pip − [p]),
where pip denotes the p-power Frobenius endomorphism on E. Note that G1 =
E(Fp)[r] and G2 ⊆ E(Fpk)[r].
Consider the ϕ(k)-dimensional lattice L (spanned by the rows):
L =

r 0 0 . . . 0
−p 1 0 . . . 0
−p2 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
−pϕ(k)−1 0 0 . . . 1
 (2)
and let V = [c0, c1, . . . , cϕ(k)−1] be the shortest vector of this lattice. The optimal
ate pairing is defined as the bilinear, non-degenerate map â : G2×G1 → µr ⊂ F∗pk
given by
(Q,P ) 7→

ϕ(k)−1∏
i=0
fp
i
ci,Q
(P ) ·
ϕ(k)−2∏
i=0
h[si+1]Q,[cipi]Q(P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
H

pk−1
r
, (3)
where for two points R,S on the curve E, hR,S is the rational function with
divisor (R) + (S)− (S+R)−P∞ and the values si are obtained by the relation:
si =
ϕ(k)−1∑
j=i
cjp
j .
By [26] this choice of the coordinates ci ensures the non-degeneracy property of
the above pairing. This pairing also has the following nice properties (see [26]
for details and proofs):
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– For every ci < 0, we have fci,Q = 1/(f−ci,Qv[ci]Q), where v[ci]Q is the vertical
line passing through the point [ci]Q.
– For every a, b ∈ Z≥0 we have fab,Q = f ba,Qfb,[a]Q.
– It is trivial to see that f0,Q = f1,Q = f−1,Q = 1.
The optimal ate pairing can be computed efficiently via via Miller’s algorithm
(Algorithm 1). Furthermore, on a fundamental level the pairing computation
can be broken down into arithmetic operations in Fp, which is a useful way to
compare the efficiency of different choices for the input to Algorithm 1.
We follow this method to compare our recommendations with earlier sugges-
tions; that is, by giving the complexity of computing one pairing as a number
of multiplications in Fp. We can then compare between the choices with differ-
ent sizes of finite field by counting clock cycles for a generic algorithm (such as
Montgomery multiplication) for Fp-multiplication.
As is standard in the pairing literature, we do not count Fp-additions as the
total cost is dominated by multiplications.
Algorithm 1 Miller’s algorithm
Input: P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, V = [c0, c1, . . . , cϕ(k)−1].
Output: â(Q,P ).
1: F ← 1;
2: for j = 0 to ϕ(k)− 1 do
3: n← blog2 cjc; f ← 1; R← Q; (Tn, Tn−1, Tn−2, . . . , T1, T0)← binary(cj);
4: for i = n− 1 to 0 do
5: f ← f2 · hR,R(P )
6: R← 2R
7: if Ti 6= 0 then
8: f ← f · hR,Ti·Q(P )
9: R← R+ Ti ·Q
10: if cj < 0 then
11: f ← 1/f
12: F ← F · f
13: F ← F ·H (cf. (3)).
14: return F
pk−1
r
The computation of the cost of Algorithm 1 is typically split into two parts:
the Miller loop, defined as the cost of steps 3-12, for each coordinate cj of the
shortest vector V , and the final exponentiation, defined as the cost of raising
an element in Fpk to the power of p
k−1
r . Note that if two divides k, then the
expensive-looking inversion in Step 11 can be replaced by exponentiation by pk/2
[2]. This is just conjugation in Fpk/Fpk/2 , so is free. For computing the number of
Fp-multiplications in the Miller loop, we followed the same method as Guillevic,
Masson, and Thome´ [20].
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Final exponentiation. Raising an element f ∈ F∗pk to the power of e = (pk −
1)/r is very expensive but there are some known shortcuts to make this operation
more efficient. As stated in several papers (see e.g. [1]), for even embedding
degrees, the above exponent can be rewritten as:
e =
(
pk/2 − 1
)[pk/2 + 1
Φk(p)
] [
Φk(p)
r
]
, where
Φk(p)
r
=
ϕ(k)−1∑
i=0
λip
i, (4)
for some λi ∈ Q. The first two exponentiations are easy to compute via Frobenius
exponentiation. We refer therefore to the final step, raising f to the exponent
λ0 + λ1p+ . . .+ λϕ(k)−1pϕ(k)−1, as the “hard part” of the final exponentiation.
In Section 4 we will give more details on the final exponentiation for the families
that we recommend in this paper.
2.3 Security
As stated in Section 1.2, the best attack on a pairing ê : G2 × G1 → GT is
the best attack on any of G1, G2, or GT . In the case of an asymmetric pair-
ing on E/Fp, where E has embedding degree k, the relevant groups for an at-
tack are G1, which is an r-order subgroup of E(Fp), and GT ⊆ F∗pk . The best
known attack on G1 is the Pollard-rho method, which has complexity O(
√
r),
and the best known attack on GT is the number field sieve (NFS) method, or
more precisely Kim and Barbulescu’s special extended tower number field sieve
(SexTNFS) algorithm [23], the concrete complexity of which can be computed
using Barbulescu and Duquesne’s method [4]. We summarize the computation
of the concrete complexity in Algorithm 2. Note that the output of Algorithm 2
depends on some choices: especially on κ, h, and S. The inputs A and B can
be approximated and then refined by trial and error (as described in [4]), but
the choices of κ, h, and S should be approached with more care. The subtlety
of choosing the best κ, h, and S is discussed in detail in [4]; we demonstrate on
a case-by-case basis how to compute these inputs for our recommendations in
Section 4. Finally, note that Algorithm 2 uses Dickman’s ρ-function ρ(v): this is
defined to be 1 if v ≤ 1, and is defined such that
dρ/dv = −ρ(v − 1)/v
otherwise.
The best attack complexity of computing discrete logarithms in GT ⊆ F∗pk
previous to the attacks [23] outlined above was guaranteed to be worse than
√
r
(given that necessarily p ≥ r) for all the embedding degrees k that were used for
computing pairings. Hence the best measure at that time for finding an efficient
pairing-friendly family was the ρ-value, given by
ρ = log(p)/ log(r).
A family with ρ-value (close to) 1 satisfied r ≈ p, ensuring that the Fp-arithmetic
was as efficient as possible.
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Algorithm 2 Computation of the complexity of the SexTNFS Algorithm of [23],
as presented in [4].
Input: A polynomial p(x) ∈ Q(x), an integer u such that p = p(u) is prime,
small integers κ and k such that κ|k, positive integers A and B.
Output: The cost of finding discrete logarithms in Fpk with the SexTNFS
method (for these inputs), or failure.
1: Set η ← k/κ.
2: Find h ∈ Z[t] such that deg(h) = η and h is irreducible mod p.
3: Set A to be the number of automorphisms of h.
4: Set w to be the number of roots of unity in Q(t)/h(t).
5: Find S(x, t) ∈ Z[x, t] such that g(x, t) ← xκ + S − u is irreducible over
Fpη = Fp[t]/(h(t)).
6: Perform a linear change of variables on p(x) to minimize the coefficients.
7: Set f(x, t)← p(xκ + S).
8: Compute {(a0, . . . , aη−1, b0, . . . , bη−1 ∈ [−A,A]2η : a0 ≥ 0}.
9: Set
Nf ← Rest
(
Resx
(
η−1∑
i=0
ait
i − x
η−1∑
i=0
bit
i, f(t, x)
)
, h(t)
)
Ng ← Rest
(
Resx
(
η−1∑
i=0
ait
i − x
η−1∑
i=0
bit
i, g(t, x)
)
, h(t)
)
.
10: Set pf ← ρ
(
logNf
logB
)
and pg ← ρ
(
logNg
logB
)
.
11: if
(2A+ 1)2η
2w
· pf · pg < 2B
lnB
then return Failure.
12: else return
2B
A lnB · p
−1
f · p−1g + 27 ·
B2
A ln2B · log2B .
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However, in most cases asking for a ρ-value close to 1 now forces log(r) to
be much larger than necessary, since log(p) has to be increased to account for
the number field sieve attacks. The complexity of Algorithm 2 varies slightly
for different members of the same polynomial family, due to its dependance on
u. Barbulescu and Duquesne also suggested a method to compute an (best-case
for the attacker) approximation for any given family: choose h = tη − t− 1 and
S = 0 or t. Of course we cannot check that h and g are irreducible, but this does
give a first approximation for the security level for a family. The security level
of a specific curve in a given family is typically 1-5 bits higher than this case.
We recommend a new additional measure of efficiency, the τn-value of a
pairing-friendly family. We define the τn-value to be
τn = log(
√
r)/2n,
where the family has “minimum” security level n, as computed by the method
outlined above. For a family with τn-value (close to) 1, the complexity of the
best attack on G1 (Pollard-rho) is approximately the same as the complexity of
the best attack on GT (SexTNFS).
3 New candidate families
3.1 Security level 128
Using the Brezing-Weng method [10], we generated 20 pairing-friendly fami-
lies and computed, for each family, the size of log(p) and log(r) that is neces-
sary to achieve (at least) 128-bit security, using the method of Barbulescu and
Duquesne [4]. In Table 1, the value D is the CM discriminant of the elliptic curve
family, and the value δ is the highest degree of twist that occurs for the fam-
ily. Families 1, 13, and 17 were already presented by Fotiadis and Konstaninou
in [14] together with the values of log(p) and log(r) corresponding to a approxi-
mate security level computation via the asymptotic formula Lpk [1/3, 1.529].
Comparing the families in Table 1, Family 17 is a clear winner (at least given
only this information). It has the most efficient Fp- and Fpk/δ -arithmetic; the
efficient Fp-arithmetic is a consequence of the fact that Family 17 has both the
smallest τ128-value and the smallest ρ-value of the table. Also, the degrees of
both defining polynomials p and r are the smallest of the table, and having low
degree polynomials contributes to a more efficient final exponentiation. Recall
from Algorithm 1 that the efficiency of the optimal ate pairing relies also on the
short vector of the lattice. For Family 17 we choose the short vector:
[6x+ 2,−1,−1,−1],
which contains only one non-constant term, and this is (only) linear.
For all of the above reasons, we assume that the most efficient family of
Table 1 with respect to pairing computation is Family 17. In Section 4, we give
more details on the efficiency of computing a pairing on two specific elliptic
curves in this family and show that this family produces more efficient choices
compared with other recommendations in the literature.
For the full information on each family in Table 1 (defining polynomials,
short vectors) please see Appendix C.
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Table 1. Candidate families for Security Level 128
Label k D deg(r) deg(p) log(p) k log(p) k/δ log(p) ρ τ128
1 8 1 4 8 760 6080 1520 2 1.48
2 8 1 4 8 760 6080 1520 2 1.48
3 8 2 4 8 768 6144 3072 2 1.5
4 8 3 8 16 512 4906 2048 2 1
5 8 1 4 8 752 6016 1504 2 1.47
6 8 1 4 8 704 5632 1408 2 1.375
7 8 1 4 8 752 6016 1504 2 1.47
8 8 1 4 8 752 6016 1504 2 1.47
9 8 1 8 16 512 4096 1024 2 1
10 9 3 6 12 624 5616 1872 2 1.22
11 9 3 6 12 516 4644 1548 2 1.008
12 9 3 6 12 512 4608 1536 2 1
13 10 1 8 14 448 4480 2240 1.75 1
14 10 5 8 14 448 4480 2240 1.75 1
15 10 15 8 14 448 4480 2240 1.75 1
16 10 1 8 14 448 4480 2240 1.75 1
17 12 3 4 6 384 4608 768 1.5 1
18 12 2 8 14 448 5376 2688 1.75 1
19 12 3 4 6 444 5328 888 1.5 1.16
20 12 3 4 6 480 5760 960 1.5 1.25
3.2 Security level 192
Using the Brezing-Weng method [10], we generated 7 pairing-friendly families
and, for each family, computed the size of log(p) and log(r) that is neces-
sary to achieve (at least) 192-bit security via the method of Barbulescu and
Duquesne [4].
Table 2. Candidate families for Security Level 192
Label k D deg(r) deg(p) log(p) k log(p) k/δ log(p) ρ τ192
21 15 3 8 16 784 11760 3920 2 1.02
22 15 3 8 16 768 11520 3840 2 1
23 16 1 8 16 768 12288 3072 2 1
24 16 1 8 16 768 12288 3072 2 1
25 18 3 6 12 792 14256 2376 2 1.03
26 18 3 6 12 768 13824 2304 2 1
27 20 1 8 12 648 12960 3240 1.5 1.125
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Families 21, 23, and 27 were already presented by Fotiadis and Konstaninou
in [14] together with the values of log(p) and log(r) corresponding to a security
level computation with the asymptotic formula Lpk [1/3, 1.529].
Where for security level 128, the comparison table gave a clear answer, for
security level 192 there are many similar options. We chose to analyze families
23 and 25 in more detail as both of these families have simple defining polyno-
mials p(x) and r(x), which helps to reduce the cost of the final exponentiation;
both families also have a good choice of short vector (although this is true for
more families). For the full information on each family of Table 2 (eg. defining
polynomials, short vectors) please see Appendix C.
4 Recommendations
As justified in Section 3, for security level 128, we recommend Family 17 from
Table 1:
Family 17: k = 12, D = 3, ρ = 1.5, τ128 = 1, sextic twists.
Defining polynomials:
p(x) = 1728x6 + 2160x5 + 1548x4 + 756x3 + 240x2 + 54x+ 7.
t(x) = −6x2 + 1, r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1.
– Short vector: [6x+ 2,−1,−1,−1].
– Choice (a): u = −264 − 263 − 211 − 210, NAF-hw(6u+ 2) = 5,
log(p(u)) = 398, log(r(u)) = 257.
– Choice (b): u = −272−271−236, NAF-hw(6u+ 2) = 5, log(p(u)) = 446,
log(r(u)) = 296.
We want the NAF-hamming weight of both u and 6u+ 2 to be minimal in this
case, for minimizing the cost of the final exponentiation and the Miller loop
respectively. It is of course possible to work directly with 6u + 2 in the final
exponentiation, but this yielded less efficient results in our case.
The security levels for choices (a) and (b) are 127 and 131 respectively. The
motivation for these two choices is as follows: choice (a) has the smallest log(p)
among the (almost) 128-bit secure choices with low hamming weight. Choice (a)
is also twist-secure, but not subgroup secure. However, subgroup attacks can be
avoided using membership checks [6]. Choice (b) has the highest log(p) among
the choices with NAF-hw(u) ≤ 3 that can still be written in seven 64-bit words,
so could be a good choice for 64-bit architecture. It is however not twist secure.
4.1 Computing the cost of finite field arithmetic
To compute the cost of the finite field arithmetic, we follow Guillevic, Masson,
and Thome´ [20].
10
Notation
m Multiplication in Fp
mi Multiplication in Fpi
si Squaring in Fpi
ii Inversion in Fpi
fi Exponentiation by p
i in Fpk
eu Exponentiation by u in Fpk
scycloi Cyclotomic squaring in Fpi
Table 3 gives the cost, in terms of m, of all the extension field arithmetic
operations that occur in the computation of the pairing for Family 17. The
costs in this case are from [20, Table 5]. This is assuming that Karatsuba-style
methods are followed for multiplication, and assuming the generic formula that
fi = (k − 2)m if k is even.
We use the generic formula for fi here because it is the fastest method in
these instances. The other natural method supposes that i|k: Define ω such that
Fpk = Fpi [ω]. Then for a ∈ Fpk we can compute api via
ap
i
= (a0 + a1ω + · · ·+ ak/i−1ωk/i−1)p
i
= a0 + a1ω
pi + · · ·+ ak/i−1ω(k/i−1)p
i
,
which as the powers of ω can be precomputed, costs (k/i− 1)mi.
Table 3. Costs of extension field arithmetic when k = 12
m2 m12 s1 s2 s12 i1 i2 i12 fi, i 6= 6, 12
3m 54m m 2m 36m 25m 4m + i1 94m+ i1 10m
4.2 Computing the cost of the Miller loop
Plugging in the values for Family 17 into (3), we see that optimal ate pairing of
(Q,P ) ∈ G2 ×G1 is given by
â(Q,P ) = (f6u+2,Q(P ) ·H)
pk−1
r .
From Appendix B we see that the most efficient computation of the optimal
ate pairing in the case of degree 6 twists is from [11, Section 5]: with k = 12
each addition step (cf. Steps 7, 8, and 9 of Algorithm 1) costs a total of
23m2 + 2s2 + 4m = 77m
and each doubling step (cf. Steps 4 and 5 of Algorithm 1) costs a total of
15m2 + 7s2 + s12 + 4m = 99m,
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except for the first, which costs
2m2 + 7s2 + 4m = 24m.
For choice (a), our short vector 6u + 2 has NAF-hamming weight 5 and the
binary expansion of 6u+ 2 is length 68, so the computation of f6u+2,Q(P ) costs
24m + 66 · 99m + 4 · 77m = 6866m.
Similarly, for choice (b), the computation of f6u+2,Q(P ) costs 7218m.
Finally, we must compute the factor H, where
H = h−(p+p2+p3)Q,xQ(P ) · h−(p2+p3)Q,−pQ(P ) · h−p3Q,−p2Q(P ).
Recall that the group order r divides 6u+ 2− p− p2 − p3, so
−(p+ p2 + p3)Q = −(6u+ 2)Q, (5)
hence h−(p+p2+p3)Q,(6u+2)Q(P ) goes to 1 in the final exponentiation. The de-
nominators of h−(p2+p3)Q,−pQ(P ) and h−p3Q,−p2Q(P ) go to 1 in the final expo-
nentiation by construction of Q, so by (5) we can put
h−(p2+p3)Q,−pQ(P ) = `(6u+2)Q,−pQ(P )
and
h−p3Q,−p2Q(P ) = `((6u+2)−p)Q,−p2Q(P ).
Therefore, the total cost for computing H is the cost of computing pQ and p2Q,
one point addition (to compute pQ− (6u+ 2)Q), two evaluations at P , and one
multiplication.
– AsQ = [XQ, YQ, ZQ] ∈ G2 ⊇ ker([p]−pi), we can compute pQ as [XpQ, Y pQ, ZpQ].
Furthermore, by construction of Q we have that ZQ ∈ Fp2 , so ZpQ amounts to
conjugation of ZQ in Fp2/Fp. In other words, the computation of pQ costs
2f1 = 20m, and similarly the computation of p
2Q = p · pQ costs another
2f1 = 20m.
– The points being added are images under the degree six twist isomorphism
of points with coordinates in Fp2 , so the cost is for point addition in Fp2 .
Using the point addition formulae from [7], this gives 11m2 + 5s2 = 43m.
– For both line functions, the gradient is an element of ωFp2 , where Fp12 =
Fp2(ω), by construction of Q. Therefore the evaluation of each line at P can
be performed by multiplying an element of Fp with an element of Fp2 , which
costs 2m, giving a total cost of 4m for evaluation.
– The multiplication of the two line functions to obtain H is a multiplication
in Fp12 , costing 54m.
For Family 17a the cost of the Miller loop is therefore the cost 6866m of com-
puting f6u+2,Q(P ) via Miller’s algorithm, plus 141m for the computation of H,
plus 54m for multiplying by H. All together, this gives a total cost of 7061m
for the whole Miller loop. Similarly, for Family 17b, the total cost of the Miller
loop is 7853m.
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4.3 Final exponentiation
Recall that the exponent e = (p12−1)/r can be equivalently written in the form
e = (p6 − 1)(p2 + 1)Φ12(p)
r
.
The “easy” part f ← f (p6−1)(p2+1) can be computed with 2fi + 1m12 + 1i12
operations. We follow [17] to efficiently compute the “hard” part. Using their
techniques, we find that
u(12u2 + 6u+ 1)
Φ12(p(u))
r(u)
= λ3(u)p(u)
3 + λ2(u)p(u)
2 + λ1(u)p(u) + λ0(u),
where the polynomials λi are defined as:
λ3 = −288u50 + 360u40 − 162u30 + 54u20 − 6u0
λ2 = −288u50 + 360u40 − 210u30 + 66u20 − 13u0
λ1 = −288u50 + 360u40 − 306u30 + 138u20 − 39u0 + 7
λ0 = 576u
5
0 − 432u40 + 204u30 − 54u20 + 5u0 − 1,
with u0 = −u.
The details of our computation of the final exponentiation is given in Ap-
pendix A. The bottleneck of the computation is the five exponentiations by u0,
each of which costs
1eu0 = 4(log(u0)− 1)m2 + (6N − 3)m2 +Nm12 + 3Ns2 + 1i2 = 1022m,
where N = NAF-hw(u0)− 1 = 3, see [22]. The total cost for computing the final
exponentiation is:
5eu0 + 8fi + 18s
cyclo
12 + 40m12 + 2i12 = 7912m,
where by [20], 1scyclo12 = 18m.
We do not claim that this is the best implementation of the final exponentiation–
further improvements may be possible.
4.4 Computing the security level
We also searched for the best choices of κ, h, and S, in Algorithm 2 to give
the most effective attack, in order to more carefully analyze the security. By [4,
Table 5], the best choice of κ for k = 12 is either 1 or 2. The change of variables
that we apply for Step 6 of Algorithm 2 is p(x) ← 108 · p((x − 6)/2), which
results in
p(x) = 4x6 − 18x5 + 69x4 − 94x3 + 108x2 + 132x+ 28;
thank you to Aurore Guillevic for this suggestion.
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Choice (a) With κ = 2, we get η = 6 as k = κ·η, so we search for an irreducible
polynomial h(t) ∈ Fp[t] of degree 6. For the best attack we would like h(t) to
have many automorphisms (more than 2)–the only choices for such an h (of
small level) are the cyclotomic polynomials Φ7 and Φ9 [4, Table 4] which in this
case are both reducible. So we search manually for an irreducible polynomial
h(t) with small coefficients (again to make the attack as effective as possible).
In this case
h(t) = t6 − t4 + t2 + 1
is an irreducible polynomial (and the best one we could find). Finally, we search
for S(t, x) as small as possible such that g(t, x) = x2 + S − u is irreducible over
Fp[t]/h(t). In this case, we found that S(t, x) = t satisfies this. The SexTNFS
algorithm performed with these choices has complexity approximately 2127.4.
With κ = 1, we get η = 12 as k = κ · η, so we search for an irreducible
polynomial h(t) ∈ Fp[t] of degree 12. For the best attack we would like h(t)
to have many automorphisms so again we check for cyclotomic polynomials. In
this case the only choice (of small level) is h(t) = Φ13(t), which is reducible.
(In fact, this u was chosen so that Φ7, Φ9, and Φ13 are all reducible). Searching
manually for an irreducible polynomial h(t), the most effective choice we find
for the attack is
h(t) = t12 − t4 − t3 + t2 − 1.
In this case, the smallest S(t, x) we found such that g = x2 + S − u is irre-
ducible over Fp[t]/h(t) was S = t2. The SexTNFS algorithm performed with
these choices has complexity approximately 2129.5.
In conclusion, the most effective parameters for the SexTNFS algorithm that
we found were κ = 2, h = t6 − t4 + t2 + 1, and S = t, giving a complexity of
2127.4.
Choice (b) The calculation follows the same procedure as for choice (a). The
most effective parameters for the SexTNFS algorithm that we found in this case
were κ = 2, h = t6 + t− 1, and S = t+ 1, giving a complexity of 2130.5. The best
choices for h and S that we found with κ = 1 were h = Φ13(t) and S = t + 1,
giving a complexity of 2133.4.
4.5 Comparison with the literature
Guillevic, Masson, and Thome´ [20, Table 9] presented a summary of the most
efficient known pairings providing 128-bit security: BN, BLS12, KSS16, and their
new families.
Table 4. Fp-multiplication timings as given in [20]
log(p) [324, 384] [385, 447] [448, 512] [512, 576] [640, 704]
m 69ns ≈90ns∗ 120ns 154ns 230ns
∗ Not given in [20]. Estimation based on clock cycles (for easy comparison).
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Table 5. Number of clock cycles per Fp-multiplication using generic Montgomery-
schoolbook methods
log(p) [324, 384] [385, 447] [448, 512] [512, 576] [640, 704]
m 99 129 166 210∗∗ 314∗∗
∗∗ This is an estimate; we did not implement these cases.
We compare our Family 17 with these examples in Table 6. We refer to
the timings given in [20, Table 8] for comparison only; those timings are also
written here in Table 4 for the convenience of the reader. Lorenz Panny was kind
enough to compute for us the number of clock cycles, using generic Montgomery-
schoolbook methods for multiplication in Fp, for 64-bit words p of length 6, 7,
or 8; see Table 5.
Table 6. Comparison of Family 17 with all known examples of ≤ 3× 106 clock cycles
Curve log(p) Miller loop Final exponentiation Time Clock cycles
BN 462 12180m 5691m ≈2.20ms 2966586
k = 6 [20] 672 4601m 3871m ≈1.95ms ≈2660208
KSS16 339 7691m 18235m ≈1.79ms 2566674
k = 8 [20] 544 4502m 7134m ≈1.79ms ≈2443560
BLS12 461 7685m 6193m ≈1.67ms 2303748
Family 17 (a) 398 7061m 7912m ≈1.35ms 1931517
Family 17 (b) 446 7853m 8002m ≈1.43ms 2045295
Remark Very recently, Barbulescu, El Mrabet, and Ghammam presented more
candidate families [5], which they claim to be “very competitive with BN, BLS12
and KSS16 at 128 bits of security”. However, we leave a careful analysis of the
number of multiplications in the Miller loop and the final exponentiation for a
good member of each of their families, in order for a full comparison, for future
work.
4.6 Two recommendations for security level 192
As justified in Section 3, we recommend Families 23 and 25 from Table 2.
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Family 23
k = 16, D = 1, ρ = 2, τ192 = 1, quartic twists.
Defining polynomials:
p(x) = (x16 + x10 + 5x8 + x2 + 4x+ 4)/4, t(x) = x8 + x+ 2, r(x) = x8 + 1.
– Short vector: [x,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
– Gives prime values for p(u) and r(u) when u = 248 + 228 + 226.
– Twist-secure for this u.
– log(r) = 384 and log(p) = 766.
The formula for the optimal ate pairing in this example is:
â(Q,P ) = fu,Q(P )
p16−1
r .
Table 7 shows the costs of the extension field arithmetic occurring in the com-
putation of a pairing on an elliptic curve in Family 23. Again, we follow [20]
to compute the cost of each operation in terms of Fp-multiplications m. The
costs for m16, s16, i16, and fi are in [20, Table 5]. We computed m4 and s4 via
m4 = m
2
2 and s4 = 2 · s2 + m2.
Table 7. Costs of extension field arithmetic when k = 16
m4 m16 s1 s4 s16 i16 fi, i 6= 8, 16
9m 81m m 7m 54m 134m+ i1 14m
For Family 23, the elliptic curve E/Fp on which we compute the pairing has
quartic twists, which we make use of to perform extension field arithmetic in Fp4
instead of Fp16– this requires performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the quartic
twist Et/Fp4 of E. There are two known curve forms for which both E and Et
can be written in the same form: Weierstrass and Jacobi Quartic. Writing E and
Et in different forms would be expensive; we would pay for many costly curve
conversions. Comparing the fastest Miller addition and Miller doubling formulas
on Weierstrass curves and Jacobi Quartic curves in Appendix B we find that
Weierstrass curves are the more efficient choice. With the Weierstrass formulae
(see Appendix B for more details), we obtain a cost of
47(10m4+8s4+8m+s16)+2(17m4+5s4+8m)+(2m4+8s4+8m)+m16 = 10331m
for computing the Miller loop.
By Eq. (4), the final exponentiation in this case is equivalently written as:
e = (p8 + 1)(λ7p
7 + λ6p
6 + λ5p
5 + λ4p
4 + λ3p
3 + λ2p
2 + λ1p+ λ0),
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where λ7 = (u
8 + u2 + 4)/4. The remaining λi are calculated recursively by
λi = uλi+1, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and λ0 = uλ1 + 1. Then the hard part is:
f
p8+1
r = y
∑7
i=0(u
ip7−i)f with y = f
u8+u2+4
4 =
[(
f
u
2
)u
2
]u6 (
f
u
2
)u
2 f,
where by [20], since 1scyclo16 = 36m, the exponentiations by u/2 and u cost:
1eu
2
= (log(u/2)− 1)scyclo16 + (wt(u/2)− 1)m16 = 1818m
1eu = (log(u)− 1)scyclo16 + (wt(u)− 1)m16 = 1854m
In conclusion, the total cost for the final exponentiation in this case is (see also
Appendix A):
8fi + 2eu2 + 13eu + 12m16 + 1i16 = 28981m.
Hence the total cost for calculating the pairing is: 39312m.
Finally, the most effective parameters for the SexTNFS algorithm that we
found were κ = 1, h = Φ17(t), and S = t+ 1, giving a complexity of 2
196.4.
Family 25
k = 18, D = 3, ρ = 2, τ192 = 1.03, sextic twists.
Defining polynomials:
p(x) = (3x12 − 3x9 + x8 − 2x7 + 7x6 − x5 − x4 − 4x3 + x2 − 2x+ 4)/3.
t(x) = x6 − x4 − x3 + 2, r(x) = x6 − x3 + 1.
– Short vector: [x, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0].
– Gives prime values for p(u) and r(u) when u = −264 − 235 + 211 − 1.
– log(r) = 384 and log(p) = 768.
The formula of the optimal ate pairing in this case is given by:
â(Q,P ) = fu,Q(P )
p18−1
r .
One may think at first sight that, as τ128 > 1, choosing a value of u for which
log(r(u)) = 384 would not give the required the security level. This is a valid
concern, but recall that the computation of the security level before choosing
a parameter u is typically an underestimation by between 1 and 5 bits; in this
case in turns out to be an underestimation by about 5 bits, so this choice of u
is sufficient.
Table 8 shows the costs of the extension field arithmetic occurring in the
computation of a pairing on an elliptic curve in Family 25. Again, we follow [20]
to compute the cost of each operation in terms of Fp-multiplications m. The
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costs for m3 and s3 are also in [20, Table 5]. We computed i18 via the recursive
formulae i3i = ii + 3si + 9mi and i2i = ii + 2si + 2mi as is done in [20] with
other examples. We computed m18 via m18 = 6 ·m6 = 6 · (6 ·m2), that is, using
Karatsuba multiplication for cubic field extensions as outlined in [12]. The cost
for s18 is from [18].
Table 8. Costs of extension field arithmetic when k = 18
m3 m18 s1 s3 s18 i18 fi, i 6= 9, 18
6m 108m m 5m 72m 208m+ i1 16m
For Family 25, the elliptic curve E/Fp on which we compute the pairing has
sextic twists, which we make use of to perform extension field arithmetic in Fp3
instead of Fp18– this requires performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the sextic
twist Et/Fp3 of E. The only known curve form for which both E and Et can be
written in the same form is Weierstrass.
With the Weierstrass formulae (see Appendix B for more details), we obtain
a cost of
43(15m3+7s3+6m+s18)+3(23m3+2s3+6m)+(2m3+7s3+6m)+m18 = 13412m
for computing the Miller loop.
For the final exponentiation, by Eq. (4) we get e = (p9−1)(p3+1)(Φ18(p)/r).
Again following the techniques of [17], we write Φ18(p)/r as
∑5
i=0 λip
i, where:
λ5 = 3u
10
0 + u
6
0 + 2u
5
0 + 4u
4
0 − 3u20
λ4 = 3u
11
0 + 3u
8
0 + u
7
0 + 2u
6
0 + 4u
5
0 + u
4
0 − u30 + 4u20
λ3 = 3u
9
0 + u
5
0 + 2u
4
0 + 4u
3
0 − 3u0
λ2 = 3u
7
0 + u
3
0 + 2u
2
0 + 4u0
λ1 = −(3u110 + u70 + 2u60 + 4u50 − 3u30 + 3)
λ0 = 3u
6
0 + u
2
0 + 2u0 + 4
with u = −u0 and u0 = 264 + 235 − 211 + 1 (see also Appendix A). The total
cost for computing the final exponentiation is:
11eu + 7fi + 4s
cyclo
18 + 15m18 + 4i18 = 24896m,
where 1scyclo18 = 36m.
Finally, the most effective parameters for the SexTNFS algorithm that we
found were κ = 1, h = t18 − t5 + 1, and S = t, giving a complexity of 2194.2.
Remark. In [1], Aranha, Fuentes-Castan˜eda, Knapp, Menezes, and Rodr´ıguez-
Henr´ıquez studied the implementation of pairings that aim at a security level
of 192-bits. However this paper appeared before the Kim and Barbulescu at-
tack [23], so we do not compare our examples with [1]. Again, in future work
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we would like to do a comparison with the new work of Barbulescu, El Mrabet,
and Loubna Ghammam [5], but this requires doing precise computations for a
well-chosen member of each family that they propose, which is beyond the scope
of this paper.
A Final exponentiation algorithms
We include here the algorithms that we used to attempt to optimize the final
exponentiation step for our three recommended families. We would welcome
any method for computing the final exponentiation that improves upon these
algorithms.
Algorithm 3 Final exponentiation for Family 17 with u < 0.
Input: Some u ∈ Z<0 such that p = p(u) and r = r(u) are prime; an element
f ∈ Fp12
Output: The value f
p12−1
r
1: u← |u|
2: t← fp6 ; f← t/f; f← fp2f;
//compute powers of f
3: f2 ← f2; f3 ← f2f← f3; f6 ← f23; f7 ← f6f;
//compute powers of fu
4: fu1 ← fu; fu2 ← f2u1; fu4 ← f2u2; fu5 ← fu4fu1; fu6 ← fu5fu1; fu8 ← f2u4;
5: fu13 ← fu8fu5; fu26 ← f2u13; fu39 ← fu26fu13;
//compute powers of fu
2
6: f2u6 ← fuu6; f2u12 ← f22u6; f2u24 ← f22u12; f2u48 ← f22u24; f2u54 ← f2u48f2u6;
7: f2u66 ← f2u54f2u12; f2u132 ← f22u66; f2u138 ← f2u132f2u6;
//compute powers of fu
3
8: f3u6 ← fu2u6; f3u12 = f23u6; f3u18 ← f3u12f3u6; f3u36 ← f23u18; f3u72 ← f23u36;
9: f3u144 ← f23u72; f3u162 ← f3u144f3u18; f3u204 ← f3u162f3u36f3u6;
10: f3u210 ← f3u204f3u6; f3u288 ← f23u144; f3u306 ← f3u288f3u18;
//compute powers of fu
4
11: f4u72 ← fu3u72; f4u144 ← f24u72; f4u288 ← f24u144; f4u360 ← f4u288f4u72;
12: f4u432 ← f4u360f4u72;
//compute powers of fu
5
13: f5u288 ← fu4u288; f5u576 ← f25u288;
//list positive powers of f
14: w0 ← f2u54f4u360; w1 ← f2u66f4u360; w2 ← f7f2u138f4u360; w3 ← fu5f3u204f5u576;
15: y0 ← w0wp1wp
2
2 w
p3
3 ;
//list negative powers of f
16: z0 ← fu6f3u162f5u288; z1 ← fu13f3u210f5u288; z2 ← fu39f3u306f5u288;
17: z3 ← f1f2u54f4u432; y1 ← z0zp1zp
2
2 z
p3
3 ; g1 ← 1/y1;
18: return y0g1;
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Algorithm 4 Final exponentiation for Family 23 with u > 0.
Input: Some u ∈ Z>0 such that p = p(u) and r = r(u) are prime; some f ∈ Fp16
Output: The value f
p16−1
r
1: t← fp6 ; f← t/f;
2: u1 ← u/2; g1 ← fu1 ; g2 ← gu11 ;
3: fu1 ← fu; fu2 ← fuu1; fu3 ← fuu2; fu4 ← fuu3; fu5 ← fuu4; fu6 ← fuu5;
4: y← fu6g2f;
5: t0 ← 1;
6: for i = 7 to 1 do
7: t← ypi ; t0 ← t0t; y← yu;
8: t0 ← t0yf;
9: return t0;
Algorithm 5 Final exponentiation for Family 25 with u < 0.
Input: Some u ∈ Z<0 such that p = p(u) and r = r(u) are prime; some f ∈ Fp18
Output: The value f
p18−1
r
1: u← |u|
2: t← fp9 ; f← t/f; f← fp3f;
3: f1u ← fu; f2u ← fu1u; f3u ← fu2u; f4u ← fu3u; f5u ← fu4u; f6u ← fu5u;
4: f1u2 ← f21u; f6u2 ← f26u; f6u3 ← f6u2f6u;
5: f2 ← f2; f3 ← f2f; f4 ← f22; g3 ← 1/f3;
6: y← f4f1u2f2uf6u3; y1u ← yu; y2u ← yu1u;
7: z← g3y2u; z1u ← zu; z2u ← zu1u; z3u ← zu2u;
8: w← 1/y; x← 1/z3u;
9: w0 ← y; w1 ← (g3x)p; w2 ← yp
2
1u; w3 ← zp
3
1u; w4 ← (y2uz3u)p
4
; w5 ← zp
5
2u
10: t0 ← w0w1w2w3w4w5;
11: return t0;
B Computing the cost of the Miller loop
There is lot of literature on the optimization of the Miller loop [3,11,13]. Our
three recommendations are for curves with quartic and sextic twists, for which
the curve forms Jacobi Quartic and Weierstrass are the most efficient; here fol-
lows a table with the most efficient formulae for Miller’s algorithm in these cases
to date. As, in the case of Jacobi Quartic curves, the curve constants are typi-
cally very large, we have assumed here that multiplication by a constant in Fpi
with an element in Fpi costs mi.
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Table 9. Cost of Miller’s algorithm for different curve shapes
Twist degree 6 4 4
Curve form Weierstrass Weierstrass Jacobi Quartic
Cost hR,R(P ) 2m k
6
+ 7s k
6
+ k
3
m1 2m k
4
+ 8s k
4
+ ( k
2
)m1 4m k
4
+ 7s k
4
+ k
2
m1
Cost f2 · h sk + 13m k
6
sk + 8m k
4
sk + 8m k
4
Cost hR,P (P ) 10m k
6
+ 2s k
6
+ k
3
m1 2m k
4
+ 8s k
4
+ k
2
m1 13m k
4
+ 7s k
4
+ k
2
m1
Cost f · h 13m k
6
8m k
4
8m k
4
Reference [11] [11] [13]
C Defining polynomials of Candidate Families
We include here some more details on the families of Tables 1 and 2.
128-bit security level:
1. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x,−1, 0, 0], x = 0 (mod 2)
p(x) = (x8 + x6 + 5x4 + x2 + 4x+ 4)/4, r(x) = x4 + 1, t(x) = x4 + x+ 2
2. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x,−1, 0, 0], x = 1 (mod 2)
p(x) = (2x8−2x7+3x6+7x4−2x3+3x2+4x+5)/4, r(x) = x4+1, t(x) = x4+x+2
3. k = 8, D = 2, ρ = 2, quadratic twists, V = [x, 0, 0,−1], x = 1 (mod 2)
p(x) = (2x8 + 4x7 + 3x6 + 2x5 + 11x4 + 12x3 + 3x2 + 2x+ 9)/8
r(x) = x4 + 1, t(x) = x4 + x3 + 2
4. k = 8, D = 3, ρ = 2, quadratic twists, V = [x2, x, 1, 0], x = 1 (mod 3)
p(x) = (3x16 − 9x12 + x10 − 2x9 + 16x8 − x6 + 5x5 − 13x4 + x2 − 5x+ 7)/3
r(x) = x8 − x4 + 1, t(x) = x8 + x5 − x4 − x+ 2
5. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [1, x, 1, 1], x = 3 (mod 6)
p(x) = (72x8 + 12x7 − 251x6 − 78x5 + 1631x4 + 240x3 − 2429x2 − 606x+ 6849)/288
r(x) = x4 − 2x2 + 9, t(x) = (12x4 + x3 − 21x2 − 5x+ 117)/12
6. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x, 2, 2,−2], x = 6 (mod 12)
p(x) = (4608x8 + 96x7 − 73151x6 − 2676x5 + 1624364x4 + 29280x3 − 10588304x2 −
278592x+ 96549696)/18432
r(x) = x4 − 8x2 + 144, t(x) = (96x4 + x3 − 762x2 − 20x+ 13896)/96
7. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x+ 1,−1,−1, 0],
x = 2, 14, 20, 26, 44, 50, 56, 62, 68, 74, 80, 86, 92, 98 (mod 102)
p(x) = (9x8 + 60x7 + 223x6 + 590x5 + 1175x4 + 1756x3 + 1963x2 + 1578x+ 666)/36
r(x) = x4 + 4x3 + 8x2 + 12x+ 9, t(x) = (12x4 + 47x3 + 48x2 + 8x+ 112)/12
8. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x+ 1,−1,−1, 0], x = 3 (mod 6)
21
p(x) = (72x8+564x7+1681x6+2352x5+2876x4+5656x3+5416x2+928x+6304)/288
r(x) = x4 + 4x3 + 4x2 + 8, t(x) = (12x4 + 47x3 + 42x2 − 4x+ 112)/12
9. k = 8, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V : could not find a useful short vector
x = 10, 60 (mod 70)
p(x) = (1225x16−56x14+117601x12−4320x10+4356173x8−113448x6+73619425x4−
1023276x2 + 480062500)/4900
r(x) = x8 + 48x4 + 625, t(x) = (175x8 − 4x6 + 8400x4 − 117x2 + 109550)/175
10. k = 9, D = 3, ρ = 2, cubic twists, V = [x, 0,−1, 0, 0, 0], x = 2 (mod 3)
p(x) = (3x12 + 3x11 + x10 + 9x9 + 7x8 + x7 + 16x6 + 10x5 + x4 + 13x3 + 4x2 + 7)/3
r(x) = x6 + x3 + 1, t(x) = x6 + x5 + x3 + 2
11. k = 9, D = 3, ρ = 2, cubic twists, V = [x− 1,−2, 1, 0, 0, 0], x = 2 (mod 3)
p(x) = 29241x12 − 350721x11 + 1576798x10 − 2506904x9 − 1833891x8 − 88143x7 +
59402835x6−144152175x5+18500997x4+173184927x3+464941830x2−1565297066x+
1150985383)/29241
r(x) = x6− 6x5 + 9x4 + 11x3− 6x2− 135x+ 199, t(x) = (171x6− 1021x5 + 1522x4 +
1883x3 − 964x2 − 22916x+ 33737)/171
12. k = 9, D = 3, ρ = 2, cubic twists, V = [x, 0, 3, 0, 0, 2], x = 7 (mod 21)
p(x) = (147x12−24x11+x10+10731x9−1322x8+37x7+294049x6−24299x5+343x4+
3584644x3 − 149048x2 + 16403632)/147
r(x) = x6 + 37x3 + 343, t(x) = (49x6 − 3x5 + 1813x3 − 62x2 + 16856)/49
13. k = 10, D = 1, ρ = 1.75, quadratic twists, V = [x2,−1, 0, 0], x = 1 (mod 2)
p(x) = (x14−2x12+x10+x4+2x2+1)/4, r(x) = x8−x6+x4−x2+1, t(x) = x2+1
14. k = 10, D = 5, ρ = 1.75, quadratic twists, V = [x2 − 1, 1,−1, 1], x = {0, 4, 6}
(mod 10)
p(x) = (4x14 − 7x12 + 11x10 − 11x8 − 9x6 + 13x4 − 16x2 + 20)/20
r(x) = x8 − x6 + x4 − x2 + 1, t(x) = x2 + 1− x6 + x4 − x2 + 2
15. k = 10, D = 15, ρ = 1.75, quadratic twists, V = [x, 0,−1, x2], x = {1, 3, 6, 13}
(mod 15)
p(x) = (4x14 + 4x13 + x12 − 12x11 − 12x10 − 7x9 + 11x8 + 17x7 + 15x6 − 3x5 − 11x4 +
x3 − 2x2 + 3x+ 6)/15
r(x) = x8 + x7 − x5 − x4 − x3 + x+ 1, t(x) = x3 + 1
16. k = 10, D = 2, ρ = 1.875, quadratic twists, V = [x4 − 1, 1,−1, 1], x = 0 (mod 4)
p(x) = (x30−2x26+2x24+x22−2x20+2x16−10x12+x10+10x8−2x6−8x4+x2+8)/8
r(x) = x16 − x12 + x8 − x4 + 1, t(x) = −x12 + x8 − x4 + 2
17. k = 12, D = 3, ρ = 1.5, sextic twists, V = [6x+ 2,−1,−1,−1], x ∈ Z
p(x) = 1728x6 + 2160x5 + 1548x4 + 756x3 + 240x2 + 54x+ 7, r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 +
22
18x2 + 6x+ 1, t(x) = −6x2 + 1
18. k = 12, D = 2, ρ = 1.75, quadratic twists, V = [x2,−1, 0, 0], x = 1 (mod 2)
p(x) = (x14−4x10 + 2x8 + 4x6−2x4 + 5x2 + 2)/8, r(x) = x8−x4 + 1, t(x) = x2 + 1
19. k = 12, D = 3, ρ = 1.5, sextic twists, V = [x,−2,−1, 1], x = {8, 23} (mod 30)
p(x) = (x6 − 8x5 + 21x4 − 17x3 + 13x2 + 45x+ 21)/225
r(x) = x4 − 2x3 − 3x2 + 4x+ 13, t(x) = (−x3 + 4x2 + 5x+ 6)/15
20. k = 12, D = 3, ρ = 1.5, sextic twists, V = [2, x, 3, 0], x = {209, 266} (mod 285)
p(x) = (x6 + 8x5 − 18x4 − 326x3 − 342x2 + 3143x+ 6859)/1425
r(x) = x4 − 37x2 + 361, t(x) = (−2x3 + 17x+ 95)/95
192-bit security level:
21. k = 15, D = 3, ρ = 2, cubic twists, V = [x, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 0, 0], x = 0 (mod 3)
p(x) = (3x16−9x15 + 10x14 + 4x13−19x12 + 24x11−14x10−6x9 + 37x8−36x7 + 8x6 +
19x5 − 20x4 + 21x3 − 3x2 − 12x+ 12)/3
r(x) = x8 − x7 + x5 − x4 + x3 − x+ 1, t(x) = x8 − x7 + x5 + x3 − x+ 2
22. k = 15, D = 3, ρ = 2, cubic twists, V = [3 ∗ x, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 0, 0], x ∈ Z
p(x) = 43046721x16−14348907x15−3188646x14+2125764x13−708588x12+177147x11+
78732x10 − 59049x9 + 15309x8 − 972x6 + 567x5 − 54x4 + 9x2 − 3x+ 1
r(x) = 6561x8 − 2187x7 + 243x5 − 81x4 + 27x3 − 3x+ 1, t(x) = 6561x8 − 2187x7 +
243x5 + 27x3 − 3x+ 2
23. k = 16, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [x,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], x ≡ 0 (mod 2)
p(x) = (x16 + x10 + 5 ∗ x8 + x2 + 4 ∗ x+ 4)/4, r(x) = x8 + 1, t(x) = x8 + x+ 2
4. k = 16, D = 1, ρ = 2, quartic twists, V = [2, 0, 0, x, 1, 0, 0, 0], x ≡ {10, 60} (mod 70)
p(x) = (245x16 + 28x13 + 23520x12 + x10 + 1920x9 + 871225x8 + 48x6 + 45204x5 +
14723760x4 + 625x2 + 361148x+ 96012500)/980
r(x) = x8 + 48x4 + 625, t(x) = (35x8 + 2x5 + 1680x4 + 41x+ 21910)/35
25. k = 18, D = 3, ρ = 2, sextic twists, V = [x, 1, 0, 0,−1, 0], x ≡ 1 (mod 3)
p(x) = (3x12 − 3x9 + x8 − 2x7 + 7x6 − x5 − x4 − 4x3 + x2 − 2x+ 4)/3
r(x) = x6 − x3 + 1, t(x) = x6 − x4 − x3 + 2
26. k = 18, D = 3, ρ = 2, sextic twists, V = [1, 0, x, 2, 0, 0], x ≡ 1 (mod 3)
p(x) = (21x12 − 6x10 + 1533x9 + x8 − 334x7 + 42007x6 + 37x5 − 6199x4 + 512092x3 +
343x2 − 38368x+ 2343376)/21
r(x) = x6 + 37x3 + 343, t(x) = (7x6 + x4 + 259x3 + 16x+ 2408)/7
27. k = 20, D = 1, ρ = 1.5, quartic twists, V = [x,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], x ≡ 1 (mod 2)
p(x) = (x12−2x11+x10+x2+2x+1)/4, r(x) = x8−x6+x4−x2+1, t(x) = x+1
23
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